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BENCHMARKS. By Henry ]. Friendly. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 1967. Pp. viii, 324. $7.95. 
A collection of previously published essays is often tedious to read 
and difficult to review. What appeared fresh on first publication has 
many times become obvious or irrelevant with the passage of time. 
Frequently the author gives no indication of his present beliefs or 
earlier errors. Benchmarks, a collection of writings of Judge Henry 
J. Friendly, suffers from none of these shortcomings. The essays, 
written over the past eight years, are as relevant and fresh today as 
when they first appeared, notwithstanding that subsequent events 
have mooted some arguments. Moreover, two chapters of this volume, 
which update earlier writings, are as current as tomorrow's news-
paper. 
The book contains writings on five general themes. The first 
concerns the law-making functions of legislatures and courts, the 
business and art of judging, and the study of the law. The second 
focuses on the problems of federal administrative agencies, a sub-
ject with which Judge Friendly has been intimately involved 
throughout his professional career. The third group of essays deals 
with the proper relationship between state and federal law and the 
growth of the federal common law. The fourth treats what Judge 
Friendly describes as the Supreme Court's seeming use of the Bill of 
Rights to impose a uniform code of criminal procedure on the states. 
The final section consists of essays on the four great judges whom 
Judge Friendly has admired most: Holmes, Brandeis (for whom 
Judge Friendly clerked), Learned Hand, and Frankfurter. 
The thread that unifies these seemingly disparate sections is the 
call to those whose decisions affect society to engage in reasoned 
decision-making. Judge Friendly states that there is a "need for 
judges and administrators to decide cases on the basis of 'clear and 
distinct' propositions and to make their reasons for decisions readily 
available" (p. vii). He also puts it another way: 
It means rather that the decider should cerebrate rather than emote 
about what he is deciding; that he should endeavor to provide a 
principle that can be applied not simply to the parties before him but 
to all having similar problems; that he should tell what he is doing 
in language that can be understood rather than indulge in flights of 
rhetoric; and that if he finds a principle is not working properly, 
he should qualify or overrule it candidly and openly rather than 
continue to profess adherence while reaching inexplicable results. 
[P. vii.] 
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To achieve this goal, the "decider" must have great knowledge and 
understanding-both of the law and of human nature--combined 
with courage and a sense of humor. 
The book is beautifully written. There are few writing anywhere 
today (certainly few lawyers) with a felicity of style to match Judge 
Friendly's. His sense and use of imagery and his deft references to 
history, literature, and music enhance the reader's pleasure and 
understanding while giving added dimension to his arguments. He 
also has the rare gift of ·writing a paragraph which makes the reader 
anticipate the next with pleasure. There is scarcely an essay in which 
his great wit, sensitive taste, and impeccable style are not present. In-
deed, this reader had to control his involvement in Judge Friendly's 
prose so that he could focus on the ideas being expressed-an equally 
enjoyable task. 
While the reviewer has occasionally considered and struggled 
with the answers to difficult and specific questions so logically put 
by Judge Friendly's court, the book takes these questions and weaves 
them into a larger tapestry. Often this is done by describing a case 
in new ways so as to challenge the reader to re-examine the case and 
his own thoughts on it. One example will suffice: 
More dramatically, as the result of the encounter between an Erie 
freight train and the not otherwise illustrious Tompkins in Hughes-
town, Pennsylvania, in the early hours of a July moming in 1934, 
what was thought for a century to be a happy hunting ground for 
the creative effort of federal judges was abruptly fenced off, and their 
activity denounced as poaching on the preserves of others. [P. 43] 
The significance of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 for federal 
judges deeply concerns Judge Friendly. He develops this theme in 
several essays in the book, the most important of which is In Praise 
of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law.2 Perhaps because 
he is a former Brandeis clerk, he feels the reader may subject his 
discussion to the most critical analysis. He is particularly eager to 
prove that the detractors of Erie do not really appreciate its meaning 
and effect, as well as to defend the result and the opinion in the case. 
He rejects the view that Erie limited the freedom and ingenuity of 
federal judges. He argues that, in fact, the decision, by relieving 
federal courts of the substantial burden of dealing with matters of 
local and limited concern, made it possible for those courts to use 
their time and skill more productively and fruitfully in developing, 
in areas of national concern, a true federal common law. 
As Judge Friendly recognizes, the federal courts have been assisted 
in this by the rapid growth of the newer areas of the law opened up 
I. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
2. Reprinted from 19 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 64 (1964); also reprinted in 39 N.Y.U.L. 
REv. 383 (1964). 
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by congressional concern with problems with which the states were 
unable to cope. He cites the willingness of the federal courts to imply 
private rights of action against corporations and their managements 
for violations of rule 1 0b-53 under the Securities Exchange Act of 
19344 and other provisions of the federal securities laws as an ex-
ample of this type of development.5 The resulting "federal common 
law of corporate responsibility" (p. 186) is, with only a few excep-
tions, uniform, binding in every forum, and, consequently, predict-
able. Before Erie, of course, this was an area foreign to the federal 
courts. 
Judge Friendly's analysis of the growing application of principles 
of federal law to the rights and duties of stockholders and corporate 
officials is, not surprisingly, particularly acute, for he has been instru-
mental in that growth. His opinion in Brown v. Bullock6-"decid-
[ing] that the standard of conduct to which directors of a registered 
investment company must conform in voting the renewal of a contract 
of an investment adviser or principal underwriter as required by 
section 15 of the Investment Company Act is a matter of federal law" 
(p. 187, footnotes omitted)-is significant and far-reaching. It was 
also among the early cases to imply a private right of action £or a 
shareholder under the federal securities law, and subsequent opinions 
have relied heavily on his opinion in this case. 
Judge Friendly wrote In Praise of Erie in 1964; subsequent 
federal court decisions demonstrate the accelerated development of 
the federal law of corporate responsibility which that essay presaged. 7 
In part, the nature of the modern corporation-whose problems and 
business transcend state boundaries-accounts for this development. 
It can also be explained in part by the recent tendency of some state 
legislatures to weaken rather than strengthen their corporation codes, 
thereby abandoning their efforts to legislate standards of conduct for 
corporate managers.8 More and more shareholders now enjoy fewer 
and fewer protections under state law. The fear which Judge Friendly 
expressed in 1964-that state legislatures would impose too rigid a 
burden on corporations and corporate managers-has proved ground-
less, and the federal courts have stepped in to fill the resulting gaps 
in shareholder protection. 9 
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (1968). 
4. 15 u.s.c. 78 (1964). 
5. E.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 
(2d Cir. 1961); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), as 
modified, 73 F. Supp. 798 (1947). 
6. 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961). 
7. E.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Bard v. 
Dasho, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Mutual Share Corp. v. Genesco Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 
1967). 
8. Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875. 
9. Some states have resisted the tendency and have strengthened their corporation 
laws. For example, see the proposed California Corporate Securities Law of 196S, par-
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A striking comparison exists between the developments in state 
corporation law in the United States and provincial corporation law 
in Canada, where the provinces have jealously guarded their sover-
eignty against alleged attempts at inroads by the federal government. 
In Ontario, for example, the Lawrence Report10 examined the exist-
ing Ontario Corporations Act11 and found it deficient in the protec-
tions which it afforded shareholders. The Report recommended 
numerous changes in the Act, including the authorization of the 
derivative suit, the existence of which in British law has always been, 
in the view of some, questionable. The Report also recommends 
strengthening the independence of auditors, and the adoption of a 
clearly defined set of obligations to be placed upon corporate manage-
ment. Legislation to implement some of these recommendations has 
already been introduced, but has not yet been adopted. 
The most significant current material in the book is found in the 
two chapters dealing with recent Supreme Court decisions on crim-
inal procedure. These chapters contain a closely reasoned dissent 
from decisions such as Escobedo12 and Miranda,13 and they dem-
onstrate Judge Friendly's willingness to take the less popular view on 
crucial issues. 
In essence, he argues that the Supreme Court's opinions in these 
cases detract from an ordered development of the law, and that the 
Constitution did not require the Court to lay down detailed rules 
of criminal procedure which are binding on both the federal govern-
ment and the states. He sees the problems of balancing the demands of 
society against the rights of the individual who is suspected or accused 
of a crime as too complex to be resolved in the framework of consti-
tutional absolutes. He contends that the variety of local experiences 
in law enforcement must be considered in achieving the necessary 
balance. He also argues that satisfactory results can be reached only 
after a careful study of the nature and effect of every stage of the 
pretrial process, and he invites "Brandeis briefs" on this subject. As 
he puts it, w,e must know "how far 111.iranda will have prevented the 
detection or the successful prosecution of serious crime and the ren-
dition to the victim of the aid society owes him, when questioning not 
offensive to a general sense of decency would have yielded a better 
result" (p. 283). Until we know this-and Judge Friendly recognizes 
that the answer will not be easily obtained-he mistrusts the absolutes 
ticularly § 25,402 which is patterned after the S.E.C.'s Rule I0b-5 and the decisions 
under that rule which have given it flesh and blood. I CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. ,I 8497-36 
(1968). 
10. ONT. SEC. CoMM'N SELECT COMM. ON COMPANY LAW, 1967 INTERIM REPORT 
(available from the Queen's Printer, 26 Breadalbane St., Toronto, Ontario). 
11. ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 71 (1960). 
12. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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and the specifics which he feels have filled the Supreme Court's 
opinions. 
This brief summary cannot do justice to the sophistication and 
erudition of Judge Friendly's argument. It is an argument which is 
entitled to additional force because it is accompanied throughout by 
an obvious and ungrudging concern for the individual and his rights. 
Like Justice Frankfurter, whom he admires so much, Judge Friendly 
is deeply involved with the rights of man, and yet, like Frankfurter, 
he believes that the Supreme Court, in the name of those rights, has 
been acting unwisely and without historical or legal support. 
The subject to which Judge Friendly allots most space is the 
performance of federal administrative agencies.14 He has long been 
one of their most articulate critics; this book includes some of his 
earlier writings15 as well as his analysis of the agencies' more recent 
performance. His criticism of the agencies relates principally to what 
he describes as their failure to develop standards sufficiently definite 
to permit fairly predictable decisions, and their failure to articulate 
the reasons for these decisions so that they might be understandable 
by those subject to the agencies' jurisdiction. He is almost equally 
concerned with the agencies' failure to recognize and to deal with 
problems before they reach a stage of crisis. He has directed other 
major criticisms at the increasing delay in the disposition of cases, 
the neglect of rule-making, and the overemphasis on ad hoc de-
cisions. 
Judge Friendly suggests remedies for these defects, although he 
is shrewd enough to recognize that cures cannot be effected over-
night. He believes that agencies have an obligation to improve them-
selves through the hiring of better staffs, but, he comments, able 
permanent staffs are possible only if the agencies are manned by 
members of high quality. Moreover, he suggests that recruitment 
and retention of able staffs are possible only when enabling statutes 
provide clear legislative mandates and permit the agencies to im-
plement and enforce them without fear of retribution from con-
stituents dissatisfied with the agency's decision. He rejects the sug-
gestion that agency performance would improve if the policymaking 
and adjudicatory functions were separated.16 Such fragmentation, 
14. Judge Friendly limits his discussion to the principal independent regulatory 
agencies. 
15. Chapter 5 of Benchmarks is a reprint of A Look at the Federal Administrative 
Agencies, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 429 (1960); chs. 6 &: 7 are reprinted from H. FRIENDLY, 
THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINmoN OF STAN-
DARDS (1962). ' 
16. Accord, Hector, Problems of the C.A.B. and the Independent Regulatory Com-
missions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960); letter from Newton M. Minow to the President, 
May 31, 1963 (available from the Federal Communications Commission). For other 
views in support of Judge Friendly's position, see W. CARY, PoLmcs AND THE R.EGU• 
LATORY AGENCIES (1967); Auerbach, Some Thoughts on the Hector Memorandum, 1960 
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even if possible, would lower the agencies' performance and morale. 
In his new essay Watchman, What of the Night? Judge Friendly 
notes that agency performance has improved since his initial wTit-
ings. He attributes some of this to stimuli such as the Administrative 
Conference and to the higher caliber of men appointed as agency 
members.17 He also detects increased willingness by agencies to is-
sue policy statements and to rely to a greater extent on rule-making 
procedures; he singles out the F;,ederal Trade Commission's Trade 
Regulation Rules for particular praise.18 While recognizing that 
adjudication is often useful,19 he nevertheless reiterates his strong 
preference for rule-making as the principal weapon in an agency's 
policy-making arsenal. He believes that agencies should prefer rule-
making to adjudication in three situations: when a detailed code 
of conduct or set of standards is to be prescribed; when the agency's 
statement of a principle will be in numerical terms; and, when the 
agency is about to move into an area in which it has previously not 
exercised its jurisdiction. 
Whether rule-making or adjudication is the better method for 
the development of policy is a question to which every professor, 
practitioner, judge, and agency member is drawn.20 Unfortunately, 
this is a question frequently better-suited to the theoretical analysis 
of the printed page than to the practical world in which agencies 
must operate. In that world, the intellectual, political, and philo-
sophical predilections of agency members may facilitate, if not make 
essential, the use of one technique rather than the other to deal with 
and to conclude necessary business. 
Clearly, there are many advantages in the use of adjudication. 
Agency members will often agree more readily on the language of 
a policy statement when that language appears in an opinion based 
on a specific record than when it is put in a rule which, divorced 
from the limitations of a record, may be susceptible to broad ap-
plication. The power to institute proceedings also affords an agency 
the opportunity to insure that cases which raise important policy 
questions come before it. An agency seeks consistency in its decision 
wherever possible, and this consistency should result, as it does in 
WIS. L. REv. 183; Auerbach, Should Administrative Agencies Perform Adjudicatory 
Functions?, 1959 WIS. L. REV. 95; 1 K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.04 (Supp. 1965). 
17. Judge Friendly is kind enough to include me in the group he cites. Apart from 
this slip, I agree with his argument and with his examples. 
18. E.g., the rule on cigarette labelling. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964). 
19. He cites with approval the SEC's decision in Cady, Roberts &: Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 
(1961). 
20. See, e.g., ·w. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES (1967); Cohen &: 
Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative 
Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 691 (1964); Elman, 
Rulemaking ProcedtLres in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARv. L. REv. 
385 (1964); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development 
of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921 (1965). 
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the courts, in a body of law from which meaningful standards can 
be distilled. And, as Judge Friendly recognizes, it is often better for 
an agency to deal with a variety of specific situations in actual cases 
before attempting rule-making.21 Adjudication is not, however, with-
out its weaknesses. It is necessarily a slow process, and the final rec-
ord may not be sufficiently complete to afford the agency adequate 
opportunity to articulate broad standards. When dealing with a 
limited record, agencies will respond as courts do: deciding on a 
narrow ground and sometimes not reaching the major issues raised 
but insufficiently developed in the case.22 
The advantages of adjudication should not blind an agency to 
the benefits to be gained from rule-making. When important to do 
so, agency members can and do quickly unite on the language of 
a rule which solves a pressing problem. In complex situations, rule-
making may be the easiest, and perhaps the only, way to obtain the 
facts necessary to govern particular behavior. It is also the simplest 
device for obtaining or soliciting the views of all parties whose ac-
tivities the agency's decision may affect. On the other hand, the type 
of conduct to be regulated, fraud, for example, may be so difficult 
to define in a rule without encompassing other activities not in-
tended to be reached that the agency has no choice but to rely upon 
adjudicated cases.23 Indeed, in these situations, the decision to rely 
upon rule-making may create serious problems of enforcement if 
the adoption of a rule is delayed or abandoned. 
Judge Friendly stresses rule-making because he believes it is the 
way best to satisfy the concern which is at the core of his principal 
theme-the necessity for agencies to articulate their reasons for ac-
tion or inaction. As he recognizes, the choice between adjudication 
and rule-making is not one between ad hoc decisions and formulating 
broad standards. An agency must maintain flexibility, but, more 
critically, it must develop understandable standards which will per-
mit those whom it regulates to order their behavior with some 
knowledge of the potential consequences. 
As one who participates in the daily business of being an agency 
member, I am heartened by Judge Friendly's optimistic answer to 
his own prophetic question.24 Despite his criticisms, he expresses a 
more hopeful, confident view of the administrative process than do 
21. See, e.g., Friendly's comments on the SEC's Cady, Roberts decision (pp. 145-46). 
22. Much has been written about Judge Friendly's criticisms of the administrative 
agencies, but it is interesting to note that he levels many of the same criticisms at the 
courts. Indeed, the passages in which he assesses the strengths and weaknesses of both 
courts and agencies are among the most significant in the book to the agency member 
and private practitioner. 
23. For a further discussion of my views on the possible hazards of rule-making, 
see my review of ,v. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES in Cohen, Book 
Review, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 399 (1968). 
~4. Isaiah 21:II, 
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many recent writers. Indeed, his view seems far mellower today than 
when he first examined administrative agencies. I think this is be-
cause he is now primarily concerned with the substance of the ad-
ministrative process rather than with its procedural shortcomings, 
real or supposed. Recognizing how much regulation pervades our 
daily lives, he now urges the agencies to fulfill their original promise 
by utilizing their expertise sensitively and intelligently. If we in the 
agencies succeed in this task, we must acknowledge how much of 
our success is due to the stimulus he has provided us (and for which, 
characteristically, he does not take credit) in recent years. 
The last few chapters are devoted to his reflections on four great 
judges. He recognizes and enjoys their literate qualities, their sen-
sitivity, and above all their appreciation and recognition of the 
fallibility of man. Judge Friendly will one day be counted among 
them. 
A careful reading of the book leaves the reader with a deep ad-
miration for Judge Friendly as a man, as a literary craftsman, and 
as a judge. His writings are marked by a constant search for a ra-
tional and consistent view of society and the role of law; and, like 
other great judges, he is a humanist rather than a narrow-minded 
preacher. Writing these essays appears to have given him pleasure. 
Reading them gave this reviewer both pleasure and a pride that 
our system can produce a judge with his unique qualities. 
Manuel F. Cohen,* 
Chairman, 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
• I would like to acknowledge the assistance provided by my legal assistant, Jef-
frey D. Bauman, in keeping my nose to the grindstone and otherwise assisting in the 
preparation of this review. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of 
policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication by any of its members or 
employees. Therefore, the views expressed here are the author's own and do not nec-
~ssarily reflect the views of the Commission or its staff. 
